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Nonrefundable option payments as liquidated damages: 
Allen v Smith, 2002 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Residential purchase agreement that labeled buyer’s deposit as “nonrefundable purchase 
option” is unenforceable as option contract. 
Allen v Smith (2002) 94 CA4th 1270, 114 CR2d 898 
The Smiths accepted Allen’s offer to purchase their ome for $1,775,000. The agreement 
contained a liquidated damages clause limiting Smith’s damages to a maximum of 3 percent of 
the purchase price ($53,250) if Allen failed to complete the purchase; a clause added by the 
Smiths’ broker required a total deposit of $100,000 “to be released to seller as a non refundable 
purchase option.” After Allen signed off on her contract contingencies and increased her initial 
$20,000 deposit with the required balance of $80,000, escrow released the entire sum to the 
Smiths. Allen later defaulted on the transaction and demanded return of her $80,000 deposit, 
claiming that the parties had not signed a separate liquidated damages provision covering the 
increase of deposit. The Smiths refused and Allen sued for breach of contract, alleging that the 
sellers’ retention of the additional deposit was an illegal penalty that circumvented the state 
policy of limiting liquidated damages by the “sham mechanism” of labeling deposit monies as 
option monies. The trial court granted the Smiths’ motion for summary judgment, enforcing the 
contract’s deposit provision as a “separate option agreement.” 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the contract was not an option. An option is a 
unilateral contract that grants an irrevocable right to purchase property at a stipulated price 
within a certain time; the option allows the optionee to inspect the property without meeting 
contingency requirements. The court found that the parties intended the agreement to be a 
standard, bilateral purchase and sale agreement, in which the buyer removed contingencies as a 
condition to proceeding with the transaction. Thus, “if inspection contingencies were unsatisfied, 
Allen was entitled to a return of her initial $20,00 deposit. Accordingly, the deposit cannot be 
considered independent consideration for an option.” 94 CA4th at 1280. Moreover, an option 
must specify (1) the time period within which the opti n must be exercised, and (2) the method 
of acceptance. The absence of these terms in the contra t also indicated that the parties did not 
intend an option. 
A liquidated damages provision is presumed invalid if the deposit exceeds 3 percent of the 
purchase price, unless the seller establishes its reasonableness. See CC §1675(d). Conceding that 
the agreement was a purchase and sale, the Smiths also argued that they should be able to retain 
the $100,000 deposit as reasonable liquidated damages. The court found that that sum bore no 
rational relationship to the harm that the Smiths might suffer on breach by Allen. The court 
remanded for entry of summary adjudication for Allen, nforcing the liquidated damages clause 
and awarding her damages equal to the amount in excess of 3 percent that had been retained by 
the Smiths.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: This decision should warn real estate brokers (if they read it or if 
their lawyers tell them about it) that meddling with the liquidated damages clause in residential 
deposit receipts can be dangerous. The contract provision that the showing broker added to the 
sellers’ counter-offer not only failed to accomplish its purpose, it also came very close to 
backfiring and letting the defaulting buyer save $33,000 from the $53,000 she should have 
expected to lose. This is clearly a case where the broker or one of the parties should have had an 
attorney do the drafting. 
If the parties agree that the buyer may walk away from the deal after paying 3 percent as 
liquidated damages, then the printed form covers the situation and it is appropriate for the 
brokers merely to advise them to initial it. But if the seller wants to be able to retain twice that 
much on the buyer’s default, the form will no longer do, and whatever is written to replace it 
should be drafted with the language of the statute (CC §1675) in mind. Converting the 
arrangement into an option—as the broker apparently sought to do—could work, but entails 
doing much more than simply calling the deposit “nonrefundable purchase option money” and 
leaving all of the other inconsistent clauses of the document unchanged. I think most attorneys 
would have done a better job along those lines (although the trial judge bought the broker’s 
language), and they also probably would have explored ther alternatives more agreeable to both 
parties.  
At the very least, I think an attorney would have wanted to make sure that if the sellers 
couldn’t keep the entire $100,000 they sought, they could at least keep the $53,000 that the 
statutory 3-percent limit would allow, whereas the broker’s drafting could easily have led to that 
being reduced to only $20,000. The court of appeal v ry charitably interpreted the clauses as 
justifying $53,000, and probably saved the broker from serious liability—both for practicing law 
and for getting it wrong.  
As a final note, I have always wondered whether the CAR provision for refunding the excess 
over 3 percent really works, in light of the statutory language that refers to the amount actually 
paid rather than to the amount retained. This opinin’s statement that the “total deposit amount is 
valid . . . only to the extent it does not exceed 3 percent of the purchase price” suggests that 3 
percent can be kept, regardless of how much the amount of deposit actually paid exceeds that 
limit. Is that really so? —Roger Bernhardt 
 
